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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS 
NO CONTRACT IS IN ERROR BECAUSE ALL 
NECESSARY ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT 
The trial court found that the "Agency Disclosure" was not a contract. (Order, 
Record at 00646). The Court reasoned that the fiduciary duties alleged in the Complaint 
were common law duties because "the duties of the real estate agents and brokers existed 
independent of any contract or agreement." (Order, record at 00646). The Order clarified, 
however, that the County's complaint pled an action for breach of duties arising out of a 
contract. 
The necessary elements of a contract are: (1) parties capable of contracting; (2) 
mutual consent; (3) a lawful object; and (4) consideration. See, Geraets v. Halter, 588 
N.W.2d 231, 233 (S.D. 1999);1 mdRoberts v. Gaskins, 486 S.E.2d 771 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1997).2 These elements are generally recognized in Utah case law. See, Brimley v. 
Gasser, 754 P.2d 97, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Golden Key Realty v. Manias, 699 
P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985)).3 
1
 The elements necessary for a contract are "(1) parties capable of contracting; (2) 
their consent; (3) a lawful object; and (4) sufficient cause or consideration." 
2
 "The necessary elements of a contract are an offer, acceptance and valuable 
consideration." 
3
 "The elements essential to contracts generally must be present in a contract of 
accord and satisfaction, including offer and acceptance, competent parties, and 
1 
Consolidated alleges that the "Agency Disclosure" is not a contract because there are 
independent common law and statutory duties which are merely reflected in the writing. 
This, however, is not an appropriate basis upon which to deny the existence of a contract 
and deprive a party of the benefits of its bargain. In essence, Consolidated is arguing that 
the "Agency Disclosure" cannot be a contract because there was no consideration. This is 
not explicitly stated in Consolidated's Brief, but in finding that no contract exists, 
presumably one or more of the necessary elements of the contract must be missing. 
Which element is missing in this case? The Agency Disclosure is in writing and is 
signed by the parties in counterparts. (Record at 00395 and 00396). Thus, the parties 
manifested their mutual assent to the contents of the document. There is no argument that 
the parties did not have the capacity to contract. This leaves "consideration" as the only 
potential missing element. This point was in fact relied on by counsel for Consolidated at 
the time of the hearing on its Motion to Dismiss. (Record at 00664, Transcript page 7, 
lines 13 and 14). At that time, Consolidated5 s counsel argued that the Agency Disclosure 
could not be a contract because it was not supported by consideration. 
A. The Agency Disclosure is Supported by Consideration 
An analysis of the writing contradicts a finding of a lack of consideration. Salt 
Lake County gave Consolidated the right to be a dual agent in this transaction. 
consideration." 
2 
Consolidated could not act as a "dual agent" with its consequent benefits,4 without 
entering into a written agency agreement with the County and WDCI. See, 
Administrative Rule 162-6-1.6.1.11.3 and Rule 162-6-2.6.2.16.3. 
In return for the County's consent, Consolidated agreed to exercise not due 
care, not reasonable care, not adequate care, not sufficient care, but the "utmost" care in 
the transaction. Consolidated bound itself to a standard beyond any owed to the County 
outside the agency agreement. This higher standard is adequate consideration to support 
a contract. 
The significance of this higher standard is demonstrated by Denco Bus v. 
Keller, 212 P.2d 469, 472-73 (Okla. 1949) (emphasis added) where that court observed: 
Instead of framing the instructions to impose the utmost or 
the highest degree of care, the court limited that term by the 
expression "ordinary care." That instruction lowered the 
standard of care fixed by law, because "ordinary care," in 
law, at least, means the same as "due care" or "reasonable 
care" while "utmost care" and "highest degree of care" is 
such a degree of care as would be exercised by a very careful, 
prudent and competent person under the same or similar 
circumstances. 
The phrase "utmost care" is not ambiguous, in that it clearly imposes a higher 
standard of care than a common law "reasonable care" standard, and requires a finding 
that the contract was supported by adequate consideration. Consolidated even concedes 
that the Agency Disclosure "actually exceeds" in some respects the requirements 
4
 This provision also avoided a splitting of the sales commission between Consolidated 
and another broker. 
3 
contained in the Utah Administrative Code. (Brief of Appellees, page 11). 
B. A Higher Standard of Care is Imposed by the Disclosure Agreement 
A comparison of the duties imposed by statute and the administrative rules5 
reveals that the fiduciary duties are not the same as those imposed by the Agency 
Disclosure. The fiduciary duties under the Agency Disclosure require more from the 
broker and agents. 
1. Duties Under the Administrative Rule 
Rule 162-6-1.6.1.11.3 requires that a broker and licensees acting on his 
behalf who represent both the buyer and seller have written agency agreements with the 
buyer and seller which define the scope of the limited agency and which demonstrate the 
broker has obtained the informed consent of both the buyer and seller to the limited 
agency.6 
Rule 162-6-2.6.2.16.3.1(a) states that dual agents or limited agents7 act in 
a "neutral capacity" and "shall advance the interests of each party [only] so long as it does 
not conflict with the interest of the other party. In the event of conflicting interests, the 
5
 Rules R162-6-1.6.1.11.3 and R162-6-2.6.2.16.3, Utah Administrative Code, 
promulgated by the Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate. 
6
 Rules 162-6-2.6.2.7 and 6.2.7.1, Utah Administrative Code, require a written disclosure 
prior to entering into a binding agreement and again at the time of entering into a binding 
agreement for a sale. 
7
 It is conceded by all parties that Martin and his agents represented both the buyer and 
the seller and were limited agents, sometimes referred to as dual agents. 
4 
agent will be held to the standard of neutrality." The rule provides that the "limited agent 
may not disclose any information given to the agent by either principal which would 
likely weaken that party's bargaining position if it were known, unless the agent has 
permission from the principal to disclose the information...". (Emphasis added). In 
subpart (c) the rule states ". . .the limited agent will be required to disclose information 
given to the agent in confidence by one of the parties if failure to disclose the information 
would be a material misrepresentation regarding the property or regarding the abilities of 
the parties to fulfill their obligations." (Emphasis added). 
Under the rules, information the broker was told by the seller that would 
weaken the seller's bargaining position if the buyer knew it, cannot be told to the buyer, 
unless the failure to disclose the information would be a material misrepresentation. 
Under this rule, the broker is burdened with determining whether the information 
disclosed by the seller to the broker merely is information that if disclosed to the buyer, 
would weaken the seller's bargaining position and as such, the broker could not disclose 
it to the buyer; or, whether the information, if not disclosed to the buyer, would be a 
material misrepresentation and as such, requires the broker to disclose it to the buyer. 
2. Duties Under the Agency Disclosure 
The Agency Disclosure is not merely a restatement of the foregoing 
administrative rule. The obligation of disclosure imposed on limited agents is 
significantly different from the duties imposed by the administrative rule. The obligation 
5 
imposed upon the limited agents by the Agency Disclosure is "a fiduciary duty of utmost 
care, integrity, honesty and loyalty in dealings with the seller and the buyer"8 (emphasis 
added) and the only limitation on that duty is that the limited agent".. .may not, without 
the express permission of the respective party, disclose to the other party that the seller 
will accept a price less than the listing price or that the buyer will pay a price greater than 
the price offered."9 
Under the standard in the administrative rule, if Consolidated had been 
told by WDCI that there were massive subsurface concrete structures, and if Consolidated 
determined that such information would weaken WDCFs bargaining position, but would 
not constitute a material misrepresentation if not told to the County, then Consolidated 
could not tell the County about the subsurface conditions. 
By entering into the Agency Disclosure, however, Consolidated agreed to 
a more liberal standard of disclosure. Under the Agency Disclosure, Consolidated was 
required to disclose whatever it knew about the property (except the amount of money 
WDCI would take). This, of course, includes information disclosed to Consolidated by 
WDCI. The County exacted a higher standard of care from Consolidated under the 
Agency Disclosure than under the administrative rule where, under the rule, Consolidated 
had no duty to disclose to the County information that might weaken WDCFs bargaining 
8
 Agency Disclosure, Record at p. 0170. 
9Id. 
6 
position. The County's position was, therefore, clearly enhanced by the Agency 
Disclosure. 
The fiduciary duties imposed on the limited agents by the Division of Real 
Estate's administrative rules are different from those imposed under the terms of the 
Agency Disclosure. The Agency Disclosure was signed by the limited agents, WDCI and 
the County (Brief of Appellees, page 7, paragraph 8), and was supported by adequate 
consideration in the form of a higher standard of care. 
Moreover, the key relationship between a real estate broker and a client is 
agency. In Wardley v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the Court of Appeals 
stated that "[A]gency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of 
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
control...". In other words, "an agency is created and authority is actually conferred very 
much as a contract is made: a meeting of the minds must exist between the parties." 
Wardley, at 89. Consolidated's argument that independent common law and statutory 
duties apply because the Agency Disclosure is not a contract must fail. 
POINT II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S CLAIM IS BASED ON ITS 
CONTRACT WITH CONSOLIDATED AND IS NOT 
BARRED BY THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
Consolidated argues that the County's action is time-barred because the claim is in 
reality a tort, not a contract claim, and is subject to the four-year statute of limitations. 
7 
This argument contradicts the record and Utah case law addressing whether an action is 
founded upon a writing for statute of limitations purposes. 
The applicable limitation10 provides that: "[A]n action may be brought within six 
years: (2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing 
. . ." . The basis of the County's action is a "contract, obligation, or liability founded upon 
an instrument in writing" squarely within the plain meaning of the statute. Consolidated 
argues that the County's claim is in reality a tort claim because "those basic duties at issue 
in this appeal would have been owed to the buyer and seller because they were 
independently established by common law and the Utah Administrative Code Rules." 
(Brief of Appellees, page 21). 
Consolidated relies on Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 80 P.2d 471 (Utah 1938) and 
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Const, 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987) in support of its 
argument against the application of the six year statute of limitations. A close 
examination of each case, shows that the County's action is properly characterized as an 
action "founded upon an instrument in writing." First, in Bracklein, at 476, the Court 
considered "whether the obligation to pay a note and mortgage liability incurred by a 
grantee in a deed with an assumption clause [is] one founded on an instrument in 
writing?" 
Section 78-12-23(2), Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. 
8 
The Court explained: 
If the fact of liability arises or is assumed or imposed from the 
instrument itself, or its recitals, the liability is founded upon 
an instrument in writing. If the instrument acknowledges or 
states a fact from which the law implies an obligation to pay, 
such an obligation is founded upon a written instrument in 
writing.... So, also, is an action in which an instrument in 
writing itself contains the contract or promise to pay or do the 
thing, to compel the doing of which the action is brought. 
The promise must arise directly from the writing itself and be 
included in its terms. An obligation being established by a 
writing, a promise to pay or perform is implied. By necessary 
inference of law and fact such promise is embodied in the 
language of the writing although it may not be expressed in 
words. 
Id. at 476. 
In contrast, the Bracklein Court noted: 
A cause of action is not founded on a written instrument 
merely because it is indirectly connected with the instrument. 
And the fact that a writing may be a link in a chain of 
evidence establishing the liability is not sufficient to say the 
cause of action is founded on such writing, nor is a parol 
acceptance of a written offer, alone, sufficient, to make an 
agreement in writing within the statute. 
Id. 
In Bracklein, the Court ultimately found that the action was founded upon an 
instrument in writing, namely an assumption clause found in a deed, which the defendant 
did not sign. Id. at 476-77. Applying Bracklein to the instant case shows that the 
County's action is properly characterized as one "founded on an instrument in writing." 
Consolidated's promise arises from a written document which it signed. (Record at 
9 
00026). The County's claim is directly predicated upon the promise contained in the 
writing, and is not "indirectly connected with the instrument." (Record at 00026). Neither 
is the writing merely a "link in a chain of evidence establishing liability." It is the basis 
of liability itself. The writing contains particularized promises of performance from 
Consolidated in exchange for allowing Consolidated to act as a "dual agent." 
Similarly, in Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Const, 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 
1987), the Court found BYU's claim properly characterized as one based on written 
instruments. The Court re-stated the test originally established in Bracklein, that "if the 
fact of liability arises or is assumed or is imposed from the instrument itself, or its 
recitals, the liability is founded upon an instrument in writing." Bracklein, 80 P.2d at 
476. 
In Paulsen, BYU sued two of its general contractors when it discovered damaged 
pipes in its Missionary Training Center. BYU alleged that the general contractors 
"negligently allowed subcontractors to install pipe insulation material that did not 
conform to the project construction specifications." Id. at 1372. The Court found that 
this claim was properly based on contract because: 
[a]bsent the contractual obligations of [the general 
contractors] to BYU, [the general contractors] would have no 
obligation to supervise construction of the Missionary 
Training Center. Only the alleged breach of their contractual 
duties gives BYU any basis for asserting they are liable for 
the cost of replacing the pipes. 
Id. 
10 
In a footnote to this conclusion, the Court observed that: 
BYU's allegation that [the general contractors] "negligently" 
failed to perform their contractual duties adds nothing to their 
cause of action; it certainly does not serve to convert this case 
into a tort action. A negligent failure to perform contractual 
duties is a breach of contract, not a tort. 
7tf.atl372n.l. 
Similarly, in this case, Consolidated and the trial court seized upon the County's use 
of the phrase "negligence" to characterize its claim as founded in tort. Under Paulsen, 
this is not the appropriate inquiry. In Ward v. Intermountain Farmers' Ass % 907 P.2d 
264, 267 (Utah 1995), the Court noted that plaintiffs "fact scenario could also give rise to 
a tort claim, it contains all the elements of a contract action. [The plaintiff] may, 
therefore, elect in this case to waive the tort and sue on the contract." In a footnote to the 
above quote, the Court cited approvingly the Restatement (Second) of Tort § 899, cmt. b 
(1979) which states that "[a]n act and its consequences may be both a tort and a breach of 
contract.. . . When this is so, the injured person, although barred by a statute from 
maintaining an action of tort may not be barred from enforcing his contractual... right or 
vice versa." The Court went on to note that "[t]his blackletter principle has been 
recognized and applied previously by this court." Id. at 267 n.2. In fact, the Ward Court 
cites the Paulsen case and characterizes its holding in Paulsen as follows: "holding that 
negligent failure to perform contractual duties may be brought as contract action and is 
not barred by tort statute of limitations." Id. 
11 
This rule serves the important public policy of allowing a party to have his or her 
day in court, rather than be deprived of a hearing on his or her claim simply because of 
potential ambiguity in the underlying nature of the claim as one in contract or tort. If the 
claim can legitimately be characterized as "founded in writing/' which it clearly can in 
this case, then the Court should allow the County to proceed with its suit as a contract 
claim and allow the County its day in court to determine whether Consolidated met or 
breached its duties expressed in the writing which it signed. 
Consolidated argues for an interpretation of Paulsen that contradicts the above-
referenced rule. The County had two potential claims, a tort and contract claim. Paulsen 
does not mean that the County is deprived of its contract claim merely because there are 
other tort remedies the County may have utilized. The subsequent citation in Ward above 
casts significant doubt on Consolidated's interpretation of Paulsen. 
POINT III 
FAILURE TO OBTAIN A LISTING AGREEMENT 
SHOWS THAT CONSOLIDATED FAILED TO 
EXERCISE THE "UTMOST CARE" IN ITS DEALINGS 
WITH THE COUNTY 
In Utah, it is unlawful for any person to act as a principal real estate broker, 
associate real estate broker, or a real estate sales agent without a license.11 The Real 
Estate Division, pursuant to Section 61-2-6, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, has 
established licensing procedures and requirements for brokers and agents. A broker or 
11
 Section 61-2-1(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended. 
12 
agent's license may be suspended or revoked upon the failure to comply with the 
requirements established by the Real Estate Division. The purpose of the licensing 
requirement is to protect the public in the handling of real estate transactions. Hagar v. 
Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo., 1981). The Real Estate Commission's rules set forth the 
specific fiduciary duties owed to seller and buyer principals. Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 
962 P.2d 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) at 89, n.3. 
At the time of oral argument on the County's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, 
reference was made to correspondence from Martin, dated November 5, 1999, wherein he 
represented that no listing had ever been signed with the parties.12 (Record, transcription 
00663, pages 10 and 11). It was argued that had there been a listing agreement,13 the 
broker and sales agent would have inquired regarding the condition of the property and its 
suitability for use. Reference was also made during the hearing to the deposition 
transcript of Mr. Lynn Cottrell, a representative of WDCI, who states it was his 
understanding that there was an arrangement with Consolidated for the sale of the 
property. (Record at 00515; and transcription 00663, pages 10 and 11). Moreover, the 
affidavit of Mr. Franks states that he was "retained" to represent the seller. (Record at 
Martin understood from Franks and Davis that the subject property of this litigation 
was never listed. Martin's Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, Answer to 
Interrogatory 13. (Record at 00253). 
13
 Utah Administrative Code Rule 162-6-1.6.1.4 requires the real estate licensee 
completing a listing agreement to make reasonable efforts to verify the accuracy and content of 
the listing. 
13 
00077, paragraph 6; and 00102, paragraph 3). One is left to ponder the status of an agent 
who is "retained" in the absence of a listing under the administrative rules. At a 
minimum, the record documents a factual dispute regarding whether a listing existed and 
if so, whether the limited agents made reasonable efforts to verify its accuracy and 
content as required by the administrative rule. (Record, transcription 00663, page 11). 
The County did undertake limited discovery against Consolidated prior to the entry 
of the court's order granting summary judgment. The County submitted interrogatories 
and request for production of documents to Davis, Franks and Martin regarding the 
procedures followed by Consolidated in the course of its usual real estate business 
transactions. (Record at 00251, interrogatory 16; and 00253, interrogatory 13). 
Apparently, because there was no listing, Consolidated failed to require WDCI to 
complete forms14 typically required from a seller disclosing conditions on the property. 
This failure was a deviation from both the usual business transaction procedures of 
Consolidated and the administrative rules. 
The failure to require a Listing Agreement precludes any type of finding that there 
was no evidence that Consolidated breached the applicable standard of care. This would 
be true even if the standard of care were "ordinary care," however, Consolidated 
14
 The forms used by Consolidated were produced by Defendant Davis (Record at 00236) 
in response to the County's Request for Production of Documents. The forms are not contained 
in the District Court's record, but include: "Exclusive Authorization of Sale", "Real Estate 
Purchase Contract", "Sale and/or Lease Hazardous Materials Warnings Disclosure", "Sellers 
Property Disclosure", and "Closed Deal Bookings Package". 
14 
contractually agreed to exercise the "utmost care." It can certainly be argued now that the 
failure to obtain a Listing Agreement from WDCI, which would have required WDCI to 
provide Consolidated with pertinent information about the property, is evidence of a 
breach of the standard of care.15 
Consolidated may argue that WDCI still would not have disclosed the conditions 
under a Listing Agreement, but this argument goes to causation, not duty or breach. It 
further raises the additional question, relevant to breach of its duty; i.e., whether it made 
any efforts at all, never mind reasonable efforts, to verify the contents of the "listing." 
The trial court's ruling and Consolidated's motion were based on duty and breach, not 
causation. 
Even if it were true that Consolidated was ignorant of the subsurface conditions or 
anything that would lead them to believe in the existence of the subsurface conditions, 
this would have little bearing on whether they exercised the "utmost care." Certainly, if 
they knew about the conditions and said nothing, they would have breached their duty of 
utmost care. However, outright deception is not the only conduct to breach the "utmost 
care" standard. If they failed to ask questions a real estate expert would ask, if they failed 
to recommend acts a real estate expert would recommend, then this would breach the 
standard of "utmost care." 
15
 The Real Estate Commission's determination of "competency" under the statute and 
rales is a "mixed question of law and fact." In the Matter of the License of Nick Topik, 761 P.2d 
32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The issue of competency involves issues of fact which precludes 
summary j udgment. 
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POINT IV 
CONSOLIDATED^ FIDUCIARY DUTIES ARE NOT 
DIMINISHED BY THE COUNTY'S RESOURCES 
Consolidated argues that the County's "sophistication" including staff and resources, 
was sufficient to make reasonable inquiry and to perform its own due diligence. (Brief of 
Appellees, pages 18 to 21). This argument fails, however, because Consolidated's 
fiduciary duties are not reduced by the County's capabilities. The duties imposed upon 
Consolidated by statute, administrative rules and the Agency Disclosure are 
unconditional. 
A professional duty of care cannot be based on a sliding scale dependent on the 
relative sophistication of the parties. For example, the County often hires attorneys to act 
as its counsel in various matters. The County also has a sizeable in-house legal staff. 
This circumstance would not give an attorney hired by the County license to commit 
malpractice. A contract attorney could not argue that the County's in-house attorneys 
should have caught an error because they are many, or they are equally qualified. The 
size of the client is not a license to commit malpractice, whether in the legal realm or in 
real estate. 
In support of its argument, Consolidated alleges that: (1) the County, by its 
attorneys, "drafted" the Real Estate Purchase Contract dated on or about December 24, 
1993. (Brief of Appellees, Statement of Relevant Facts, paragraph 7, page 6); and (2) the 
engineering firm of Eckhoff, Watson and Preator was ". . .hired by the County to perform 
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soils assessment on the property for analysis of prior contamination. (Emphasis added). 
At least six (6) soil borings to twelve (12) feet deep were performed on the property." 
(Brief of Appellees, paragraph 12, pages 8 and 20). A review of the record shows these 
allegations and Consolidated5s implications are drastically in error. 
A. The Eckhoff Watson and Preator report was written for WDCL not the 
County 
The written report prepared by Eckhoff, Watson and Preator, dated October 12, 
1989, was made under a contract with WDCI, not the County. (Record at 00005, 
paragraph 25; Response to Interrogatory No. 15, at 00285). The report is dated four years 
before the County considered the property as a possible construction site. (Record at 
00004, paragraph 15). Consolidated's Brief implies, however, that the County hired 
Eckhoff, Watson and Preator to locate footings, foundations or other subsurface 
structures, and that Eckhoff, Watson and Preator provided the report to the County in 
1989 as part of the preacquisition due diligence. In fact, this report was provided to the 
County by WDCI sometime after the December 24, 1993, offer. (Record at 00005, 
paragraph 25, and 00028; Brief of Appellees, page 7, paragraph 9). The report 
documents the removal of underground storage tanks for WDCI and removal of 
petroleum contaminated soil around the tanks. (Record at 00028 and 00094). It has no 
bearing whatsoever on Consolidated5 s breach of its contractual duties. 
B. The County Did Not "Draft" The Real Estate Purchase Contract 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract is a standard pre-printed form approved by 
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the Salt Lake Board of Realtors. (Record at 00022 to 00024). A review of the form by the 
County Attorney's Office was merely to confirm the appropriate blanks on the form were 
filled in and that it was a lawful agreement. The County did not "draft" the contract as 
implied by Consolidated. 
C. The County Did Not Have An Opportunity To Discover What "Others" At 
Consolidated May Have Known. 
The statement of relevant facts in Consolidated's Brief states, "Neither Franks 
nor anyone at Consolidated was aware of or had ever been led to believe there were 
subsurface concrete and waste pilings, footings, slabs, debris or other material under the 
surface of the property." (Brief of Appellees, paragraph 2, page 5). It should be noted, 
however, that the record contains no information regarding what anyone else at 
Consolidated knew about the property, other than Martin, Franks and Davis. The County 
did not have an opportunity to discover what "others" at Consolidated may have known 
because the trial court denied its Rule 56(f) Motion for additional time. 
Consolidated has failed to marshal facts sufficient to establish that the County 
had special knowledge, sophistication or expertise to such an extent that it was equivalent 
to prior notice of the undisclosed subsurface conditions. The County certainly does not 
deny that it performed a reasonable amount of preacquisition due diligence prior to 
closing. It did not, however, have the type of information, independent knowledge or 
degree of control over the transaction as implied in Consolidated's Brief. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE 
COUNTY'S RULE 56(f) MOTION 
In response to Salt Lake County's Complaint, Consolidated filed a Motion to 
Dismiss which was accompanied by affidavits of the individual defendants denying any 
knowledge of the subsurface conditions at issue in this case. The County, in addition to a 
substantive response to the motion, filed a Rule 56(f) Motion seeking the opportunity to 
conduct further discovery. The trial court denied the County's Rule 56(f) Motion without 
explanation. 
On appeal, Consolidated attempts to justify the trial court's decision by astonishingly 
arguing that "the most that Salt Lake County could hope for is an opportunity to discredit 
the statements made by Martin, Franks and Davis in their affidavits." (Brief of 
Appellees, page 27). Certainly, if the County could accomplish so little, the purpose of 
Rule 56(f) would have been served. The statements in the affidavits were the foundation 
of Consolidated's motion and the trial court's later ruling. In essence, the trial court 
enabled Consolidated to win the case by allowing the defendants to file affidavits denying 
the allegations contained in the Complaint, but denying plaintiff the opportunity to cross-
examine the defendants. No case should be resolved by the sworn testimony of a party, 
absent the opportunity to examine the basis and foundation for the assertions which deny 
the County's day in court. Such a ruling does not promote the interests of justice, and is 
inconsistent with Rule 56(f). 
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Consolidated also references the County's efforts at formal and informal discovery. 
First, the County's efforts at informal discovery is irrelevant. Rule 56(f) is a rule by 
which a party seeks the court's permission to conduct further formal discovery. There is 
never any bar on conducting informal discovery. Second, it is true that the County did 
conduct some formal discovery. This consisted of written interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents on both WDCI and Consolidated. (Record at 00219 to 00233). It 
is not dilatory to first obtain what documents the opposing party has prior to conducting 
any depositions. Indeed, it would be folly to have conducted any depositions in this case 
prior to obtaining and reviewing all documents available through discovery. While it is 
true Consolidated complied with the County's written discovery requests, the responses 
were filed late,16 only weeks before the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. However, the 
Rule 56(f) Motion was primarily to obtain the depositions of the individual defendants. 
(Record at 00149, paragraph 12). By its opposition to the County's Rule 56(f) Motion, 
Consolidated denied the County the opportunity to do this.17 No where does Consolidate 
represent that it would have made its individual defendants available for a deposition. 
The law under Rule 56(f) is well-settled and the facts, as they relate to this issue, are 
16
 The Certificate of Service on Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents to Consolidated is dated October 20,1998. (Record at 00219). The 
Certificate of Service on Consolidated's responses is dated January 7,1999. (Record at 00236 to 
00243). 
17
 The County did depose a WDCI official as well as a non-party. (Record at 00326 and 
00422). Consolidated elected not to participate. 
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not in dispute. The County submits that its motion should have been granted so that it 
could have deposed the individual Consolidated defendants on the statements which 
formed the basis not only of Consolidated's motion, but the trial court's ruling disposing 
of the County's complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the County's principal brief and the reasons set forth 
herein, the County requests that: (1) the trial court's Order denying the County's Rule 
56(f) Motion be reversed and the County be allowed to conduct additional discovery 
against Consolidated; and (2) the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment in favor of 
Consolidated be reversed and the County be allowed to proceed with its claims against 
Consolidated. 
DATED this Z~\ day of March, 2001. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
/ CR^/lG W. AND^RS( " ON 
)eputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Agency Disclosure 
B. Rule Rl 62-6-1 Utah Administrative Code 
C. Rule Rl 62-6-2 Utah Administrative Code 
D. Section 61-2-1 Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended 
E. Section 61-2-6 Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended 
F. Section 78-12-23 Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended 
G. Rule 56(f) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
H. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, comment "b" 
ADDENDUM 
A 
AGENCY DISCLOSURE 
H US DISCLOSURE FORM IS INTONED K>R USF. BY RF-Ai. 1STA11- UQ-NSI-ICS 
IN DISCUOS3NC ACfiNCV RELATIONS!II^ S) TO HUY12R AND S3JJ* 
Wncn you enter into a discussion with a real estate agent Tvpr6in£ a real estate transaction, vou should, from the outset, understand who 
Uv real estate agent is representing tn the transaction. More Importantly, you should understand how that agency relationship impacts your 
business relationship with the real estate agent and the Buyer or Seder. 
Duties of Seller's Agent 
A real estate agent who has listed a Seller's property for sale acts as the agent for the Seller only and has a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the 
Seller, in practical terms, the Seller has hired the agent to sell their propeny and that agent should attempt to obtain for the Seller the most 
favorable sales price and terms. Although the Seller's agent has this fiduciary duty to the Seller, that agent is. by law, responsible to all 
prospective Buyers to treat them with honesty, fair dealing, and with good faith. A Seller's agent under a listing agrccmeni with Seller acts 
as the agent for the Seller only. A seller's agent or a subagent of that agent has the following affirmative obligations: (lo the Seller) A 
fiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty In dealings with the Seller; (To the Buyer and the Seller) (a) A duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skills, and diligence in performance of the agent's duties; (b) A duty of honesty and fair dealing with good faith; (c) A duty 
to disclose all facts known to the agent which materially affect the propeny that arc not known to. or within the diligent attention and 
observation of, the parties. 
Duties of Buyer's Agent 
A real estate agent can, with a Buyer's written consent, defining how the agent will be paid, agree to act as agent for the Buyer only. As agent 
working on behalf of the Buyer, the agent has a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the Buyer. In practical terms, that means the Buyer's agent is 
concerned with the Buyer's best interests in the transaction, including attempting to obtain for the Buyer the most favorable sales pnee and 
terms. A selling agent can. with a Buyer's consent, agree to act as agent for the Buyer only. In these situations, the agent Is not the Seller's 
agent, even if by agreement the agent may receive a commission from the SeBcr. An agent aalng only for the Buyer has the foUowlng 
affirmative obligations: (To the Buyer) (a) A fiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty in dealings with the ScBer; (To the 
Buyer and the Seller) (a) A duty to exercise reasonable care skills and diligence in performance of the agent's duties; (b) A duty of honesty 
and fair dealing with good faith; (c) A duty to disclose all facts known to the agent which materially affect the value of propeny that are not 
known to or within the dittgengatautiou Jiiii OtBervauon oTthe parties. 
Duties of Agent Representing both Buyer and Seller 
A real estate agent, either acting directly or though one OMrTdrTasMxiate licenses, uuy legally be thragerft oT both the SeBer and the Buyer 
in a transaction, but only with the knowledge and consent of both the Seller and the Buyer. In a dual agency situation, the agent has the 
following affirmative obligations to both the SeBer and the Buyer: (a) A fiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty, and loyalty in 
dealings with the SeBer and the Buyer; (b) Other duties to the Seller and the Buyer as stated above In their respective sections. In representing 
both SeUcr and Buyer, the agent may not. without the express permission of the respective part}', disclose to the other parry that the SeBcr 
will accept a price less than the listing price or that the Buyer will pay a price greater than the pnee offered. 
Duties of Buyer and Seller 
The above duties of real estate agents in a real estate transaction do not rdic^t a SeBer or a Buyer from the responsibility to exercise good 
business judgment in protecting their respective interests. You should carefully read all agreements to assure that they adequately express 
your understanding of the transaction. If legal or tax advice is desired, consult a competent professional attorney or accountant. 
Confirmation of Agency Disclosure 
At Lie signing of this agreement, the foBowing agency relationship^) Is/arc hereby confirmed for the t; 
Tne real estate agemrC^V— is the agent of (circle one w] 
(Signature of Licensee) 
Acknowledgement 
l/we acknowledge receipt of a copy of this disclosure and confirmation, and understand and agree with the agency relauonship confirmed 
herein. 
BUYZJ^SJLLER^ l/J^ZZdwl/j Z / / ° Date 2JS use, 9 J Time AM/PM 
Date Tune AM/PM 
By Date 
Ar!C\rT 
ADDENDUM 
B 
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Rl 62-6-1. Improper Practices. 
6.1.1. False devices. A licensee shall not propose, prepare, or cause to be prepared any 
document, agreement, closing statement, or any other device or scheme, which does not reflect 
the true terms of the transaction, nor shall a licensee knowingly participate in any transaction in 
which a similar device is used. 
6.1.1.1. Loan Fraud. A licensee shall not participate in a transaction in which a buyer enters 
into any agreement that is not disclosed to the lender, which, if disclosed, may have a material 
effect on the terms or the granting of the loan. 
6.1.1.2. Double Contracts. A licensee shall not use or propose the use of two or more 
purchase agreements, one of which is not made known to the prospective lender or loan 
guarantor. 
6.1.2. Signs. It is prohibited for any licensee to have a sign on real property without the 
written consent of the property owner. 
6.1.3. Licensee's Interest in a Transaction. A licensee shall not buy, sell, or lease or rent any 
real property as a principal, either directly or indirectly, without first disclosing in writing on the 
purchase agreement or the lease or rental agreement his true position as principal in the 
transaction. A licensee will be considered to be a principal for the purposes of this rule if he is 
an owner, officer, director, partner, member, or employee of an entity which is a principal in the 
transaction. In the case of a licensee who is a stockholder but who is not an officer, director or 
employee of a corporation which is a principal in the transaction, the licensee will be considered 
to be a principal for the purposes of this rule if he owns more than 10% of the stock of the 
corporation. 
6.1.4. Listing Content. The real estate licensee completing a listing agreement is responsible 
to make reasonable efforts to verify the accuracy and content of the listing. 
6.1.4.1. Net listings are prohibited and shall not be taken by a licensee. 
6.1.5. Advertising. This rule applies to all advertising materials, including newspaper, 
magazine, Internet, e-mail, radio, and television advertising, direct mail promotions, business 
cards, door hangers, and signs. 
6.1.5.1. Any advertising by active licensees that does not include the name of the real estate 
brokerage as shown on Division records is prohibited except as otherwise stated herein. 
6.1.5.2 If the licensee advertises property in which he has an ownership interest and the 
property is not listed, the ad need not appear over the name of the real estate brokerage if the ad 
includes the phrase "owner-agent" or the phrase "owner-broker". 
6.1.5.3. Names of individual licensees may be advertised in addition to the brokerage name. 
If the names of individual licensees are included in advertising, the brokerage must be identified 
in a clear and conspicuous manner. This requirement may be satisfied by identifying the 
brokerage in lettering which is at least one-half the size of the lettering which identifies the 
individual licensees. 
6.1.5.4. Advertising teams, groups, or other marketing entities which are not licensed as 
brokerages is prohibited if the advertising states "owner-agent" or "owner-broker" instead of the 
brokerage name. 
6.1.5.5. Advertising teams, groups, or other marketing entities which are not licensed as 
brokerages is permissible in advertising which includes the brokerage name upon the following 
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conditions: 
(a) The brokerage must be identified in a clear and conspicuous manner. This requirement 
may be satisfied by identifying the brokerage in lettering which is at least one-half the size of the 
lettering which identifies the team, group, or other marketing entity; and 
(b) The advertising shall clearly indicate that the team, group, or other marketing entity is 
not itself a brokerage and that all licensees involved in the entity are affiliated with the brokerage 
named in the advertising. 
6.1.5.6 If any photographs of personnel are used, the actual roles of any individuals who are 
not licensees must be identified in terms which make it clear that they are not licensees. 
6.1.5.7. Any artwork or text which states or implies that licensees have a position or status 
other than that of sales agent or associate broker affiliated with a brokerage is prohibited. 
6.1.5.8. Under no circumstances may a licensee advertise or offer to sell or lease property 
without the written consent of the owner of the property or the listing broker. Under no 
circumstances may a licensee advertise or offer to sell or lease property at a lower price than that 
listed without the written consent of the seller or lessor. 
6.1.5.9 If an active licensee advertises to purchase or rent property, all advertising must 
contain the name of the licensee's real estate brokerage as shown on Division records. 
6.1.6. Double Commissions. In order to avoid subjecting the seller to paying double 
commissions, licensees must not sell listed properties other than through the listing broker. A 
licensee shall not subject a principal to paying a double commission without the principal's 
informed consent. 
6.1.6.1. A licensee shall not enter or attempt to enter into a concurrent agency representation 
agreement with a buyer or a seller, a lessor or a lessee, when the licensee knows or should know 
of an existing agency representation agreement with another licensee. 
6.1.7. Retention of Buyer's Deposit. A principal broker holding an earnest money deposit 
shall not be entitled to any of the deposit without the written consent of the buyer and the seller. 
6.1.8. Unprofessional conduct. No licensee shall engage in any of the practices described in 
Section 61-2-2, et seq., whether acting as agent or on his own account, in a manner which fails to 
conform with accepted standards of the real estate sales, leasing or management industries and 
which could jeopardize the public health, safety, or welfare and includes the violation of any 
provision of Section 61-2-2, et seq. or the rules of this chapter. 
6.1.9. Finder's Fees. A licensee may not pay a finder's fee or give any valuable consideration 
to an unlicensed person or entity for referring a prospect in a real estate transaction, except as 
provided in this rule. 
6.1.9.1. Token gifts. A licensee may give a gift valued at $50 or less to an individual in 
appreciation for an unsolicited referral of a prospect which resulted in a real estate transaction. 
6.1.10. Referral fees from lenders. A licensee may not receive a referral fee from a lender. 
6.1.11. Failure to have written agency agreement. To avoid representing more than one 
party without the informed consent of all parties, principal brokers and licensees acting on their 
behalf shall have written agency agreements with their principals. The failure to define an 
agency relationship in writing will be considered unprofessional conduct and grounds for 
disciplinary action by the Division. 
6.1.11.1. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent a seller shall 
have a written agency agreement with the seller defining the scope of the agency. 
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6.1.11.2. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent a buyer shall 
have a written buyer agency agreement with the buyer defining the scope of the agency. 
6.1.11.3. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent both buyer and 
seller shall have written agency agreements with both buyer and seller which define the scope of 
the limited agency and which demonstrate that the principal broker has obtained the informed 
consent of both buyer and seller to the limited agency as set forth in Section Rl 62-6.2.16.3.1. 
6.1.11.4. A licensee affiliated with a brokerage other than the listing brokerage who wishes 
to act as a sub-agent for the seller, shall, prior to showing the seller's property: 
(a) obtain permission from the principal broker with whom he is affiliated to act as a 
sub-agent; 
(b) notify the listing brokerage that sub-agency is requested; 
(c) enter into a written agreement with the listing brokerage consenting to the sub-agency and 
defining the scope of the agency; and 
(d) obtain from the listing brokerage all information about the property which the listing 
brokerage has obtained. 
6.1.11.5. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who act as a property manager 
shall have a written property management agreement with the owner of the property defining the 
scope of the agency. 
6.1.11.6. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent a tenant shall 
have a written agreement with the tenant defining the scope of the agency. 
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Rl 62-6-2. Standards of Practice. 
6.2.1. Approved Forms. The following standard forms are approved by the Utah Real Estate 
Commission and the Office of the Attorney General for use by all licensees: 
(a) September 30, 1999, Real Estate Purchase Contract (mandated use of this form is July 1, 
2000); 
(b) January 1,1999 Real Estate Purchase Contract for Residential Construction; 
(c) January 1,1987, Uniform Real Estate Contract; 
(d) October 1,1983, All Inclusive Trust Deed; 
(e) October 1,1983, All Inclusive Promissory Note Secured by All Inclusive Trust Deed; 
(f) January 1,1999, Addendum/Counteroffer to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(g) January 1,1999, Seller Financing Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(h) January 1, 1999, Survey Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(i) January 1,1999, Buyer Financial Information Sheet; 
(j) January 1, 1999, FHA/VA Loan Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(k) January 1,1999, Assumption Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(1) January 1,1999, Lead-based Paint Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract; 
(m) January 1, 1999, Disclosure and Acknowledgment Regarding Lead-based Paint and/or 
Lead-based Paint Hazards. 
6.2.1.1. Forms Required for Closing. Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out 
forms in addition to the standard state-approved forms if the additional forms are necessary to 
close a transaction. Examples include closing statements, and warranty or quit claim deeds. 
6.2.1.2. Forms Prepared by an Attorney. Any licensee may fill out forms prepared by the 
attorney for the buyer or lessee or the attorney for the seller or lessor to be used in place of any 
form listed in Rl 62-6.2.1 (a) through (g) if the buyer or lessee or the seller or lessor requests that 
other forms be used and the licensee verifies that the forms have in fact been drafted by the 
attorney for the buyer or lessee, or the attorney for the seller or lessor. 
6.2.1.3. Additional Forms. If it is necessary for a licensee to use a form for which there is no 
state-approved form, for example, the licensee may fill in the blanks on any form which has been 
prepared by an attorney, regardless of whether the attorney was employed for the purpose by the 
buyer, seller, lessor, lessee, brokerage, or an entity whose business enterprise is selling blank 
legal forms. 
6.2.1.4. Standard Supplementary Clauses. There are Standard Supplementary Clauses 
approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission which may be added to Real Estate Purchase 
Contracts by all licensees. The use of the Standard Supplementary Clauses will not be 
considered the unauthorized practice of law. 
6.2.2. Copies of Agreement. After a purchase agreement is properly signed by both the 
buyer and seller, it is the responsibility of each participating licensee to cause copies thereof, 
bearing all signatures, to be delivered or mailed to the buyer and seller with whom the licensee is 
dealing. The licensee preparing the document shall not have the parties sign for a final copy of 
the document prior to all parties signing the contract evidencing agreement to the terms thereof. 
After a lease is properly signed by both landlord and tenant, it is the responsibility of the 
principal broker to cause copies of the lease to be delivered or mailed to the landlord or tenant 
with whom the brokerage or property management company is dealing. 
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6.23. Residential Construction Agreement. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement for 
Residential Construction must be used for all transactions for the construction of dwellings to be 
built or presently under construction for which a Certificate of Occupancy has not been issued. 
6.2.4. Employee Licensee. A real estate licensee working as a regular salaried employee as 
defined in section 1 of these rules, who sells real estate owned by the employer or leases real 
estate owned by the employer, may only do so and may only be compensated directly by the 
employer under one of the following conditions: (1) the licensee is a principal broker; (2) the 
employer has on its staff a principal broker with whom the licensee affiliates for sales or 
management transactions; or (3) the employer contracts with a principal broker so that all 
employed licensees are affiliated with and supervised by a principal broker. 
6.2.5. Real Estate Auctions. A principal broker who contracts or in any manner affiliates 
with an auctioneer or auction company which is not licensed under the provisions of Section 
61-2-1 et seq. for the purpose of enabling that auctioneer or auction company to auction real 
property in this state, shall be responsible to assure that all aspects of the auction comply with the 
requirements of this section and all other laws otherwise applicable to real estate licensees in real 
estate transactions. Auctioneers and auction companies who are not licensed under the 
provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. may conduct auctions of real property located within this 
state upon the following conditions: 
6.2.5.1. Advertising. All advertising and promotional materials associated with an auction 
must conspicuously disclose that the auction is conducted under the supervision of a named 
principal broker licensed in this state; and 
6.2.5.2. Supervision. The auction must be conducted under the supervision of a principal 
broker licensed in this state who must be present at the auction; and 
6.2.5.3. Use of Approved Forms. Any purchase agreements used at the auction must meet 
the requirements of Section 61-2-20 and must be filled out by a Utah real estate licensee; and 
6.2.5.4. Placement of Deposits. All monies deposited at the auction must be placed either in 
the real estate trust account of the principal broker who is supervising the auction or in an escrow 
depository agreed to in writing by the parties to the transaction. 
6.2.5.5. Closing Arrangements. The principal broker supervising the auction shall be 
responsible to assure that adequate arrangements are made for the closing of each real estate 
transaction arising out of the auction. 
6.2.6. Guaranteed Sales. As used herein, the term "guaranteed sales plan" includes: (a) any 
plan in which a seller's real estate is guaranteed to be sold or; (b) any plan whereby a licensee or 
anyone affiliated with a licensee will purchase a seller's real estate if it is not purchased by a third 
party in the specified period of a listing or within some other specified period of time. 
6.2.6.1. In any real estate transaction involving a guaranteed sales plan, the licensee shall 
provide full disclosure as provided herein regarding the guarantee: 
(a) Written Advertising. Any written advertisement by a licensee of a "guaranteed sales 
plan" shall include a statement advising the seller that if the seller is eligible, costs and 
conditions may apply and advising the seller to inquire of the licensee as to the terms of the 
guaranteed sales agreement. This information shall be set forth in print at least one-fourth as 
large as the largest print in the advertisement. 
(b) Radio/Television Advertising. Any radio or television advertisement by a licensee of a 
"guaranteed sales plan" shall include a conspicuous statement advising if any conditions and 
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limitations apply. 
(c) Guaranteed Sales Agreements. Every guaranteed sales agreement must be in writing and 
contain all of the conditions and other terms under which the property is guaranteed to be sold or 
purchased, including the charges or other costs for the service or plan, the price for which the 
property will be sold or purchased and the approximate net proceeds the seller may reasonably 
expect to receive. 
6.2.7. Agency Disclosure. In every real estate transaction involving a licensee, as agent or 
principal, the licensee shall clearly disclose in writing to his respective client(s) or any 
unrepresented parties, his agency relationship(s). The disclosure shall be made prior to the 
parties entering into a binding agreement with each other. The disclosure shall become part of 
the permanent file. 
6.2.7.1. When a binding agreement is signed in a sales transaction, the prior agency 
disclosure shall be confirmed in the currently approved Real Estate Purchase Contract or, with 
substantially similar language, in a separate provision incorporated in or attached to that binding 
agreement. 
6.2.7.2. When a lease or rental agreement is signed, a separate provision shall be 
incorporated in or attached to it confirming the prior agency disclosure. The agency disclosure 
shall be in the form stated in Rl 62-6.2.7.1, but shall substitute terms applicable for a rental 
transaction for the terms "buyer", "seller", "listing agent", and "selling agent". 
6.2.7.3. Disclosure to other agents. An agent who has established an agency relationship 
with a principal shall disclose who he or she represents to another agent upon initial contact with 
the other agent. 
6.2.8. Duty to Inform. Sales agents and associate brokers must keep their principal broker or 
branch broker informed on a timely basis of all real estate transactions in which the licensee is 
involved, as agent or principal, in which the licensee has received funds on behalf of the 
principal broker or in which an offer has been written. 
6.2.9. Broker Supervision. Principal brokers and associate brokers who are branch brokers 
shall be responsible for exercising active supervision over the conduct of all licensees affiliated 
with them. 
6.2.9.1. A broker will not be held responsible for inadequate supervision if: 
(a) An affiliated licensee violates a provision of Section 61-2-1, et seq., or the rules 
promulgated thereunder, in contravention of the supervising broker's specific written policies or 
instructions; and 
(b) Reasonable procedures were established by the broker to ensure that licensees receive 
adequate supervision and the broker has followed those procedures; and 
(c) Upon learning of the violation, the broker attempted to prevent or mitigate the damage; 
and 
(d) The broker did not participate in the violation; and 
(e) The broker did not ratify the violation; and 
(f) The broker did not attempt to avoid learning of the violation. 
6.2.9.2. The existence of an independent contractor relationship or any other special 
compensation arrangement between the broker and affiliated licensees shall not release the 
broker and licensees of any duties, obligations, or responsibilities. 
6.2.10. Disclosure of Fees. If a real estate licensee who is acting as an agent in a transaction 
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will receive any type of fee in connection with a real estate transaction in addition to a real estate 
commission, that fee must be disclosed in writing to all parties to the transaction. 
6.2.11. Fees from Builders. All fees paid to a licensee for referral of prospects to builders 
must be paid to the licensee by the principal broker with whom he is licensed and affiliated. All 
fees must be disclosed as required by Rl 62-6.2.10. 
6.2.12. Fees from Manufactured Housing Dealers. If a licensee refers a prospect to a 
manufactured home dealer or a mobile home dealer, under terms as defined in Section 58-56-1, 
et seq., any fee paid for the referral of a prospect must be paid to him by the principal broker with 
whom he is licensed. 
6.2.13. Gifts and Inducements. A gift given by a principal broker to a buyer or seller, lessor 
or lessee, in a real estate transaction as an inducement to use the services of a real estate 
brokerage, or in appreciation for having used the services of a brokerage, is permissible and is 
not an illegal sharing of commission. If an inducement is to be offered to a buyer or seller, lessor 
or lessee, who will not be obligated to pay a real estate commission in a transaction, the principal 
broker must obtain from the party who will pay the commission written consent that the 
inducement be offered. 
6.2.14. "Due-On-Sale" Clauses. Real estate licensees have an affirmative duty to disclose in 
writing to buyers and sellers the existence or possible existence of a "due-on-sale" clause in an 
underlying encumbrance on real property, and the potential consequences of selling or 
purchasing a property without obtaining the authorization of the holder of the underlying 
encumbrance. 
6.2.15. Personal Assistants. With the permission of the principal broker with whom the 
licensee is affiliated, the licensee may employ an unlicensed individual to provide services in 
connection with real estate transactions which do not require a real estate license, including the 
following examples: 
(a) Clerical duties, including making appointments for prospects to meet with real estate 
licensees, but only if the contact has been initiated by the prospect and not by the unlicensed 
person; 
(b) At an open house, distributing preprinted literature written by a licensee, so long as a 
licensee is present and the unlicensed person furnishes no additional information concerning the 
property or financing and does not become involved in negotiating, offering, selling or filling in 
contracts; 
(c) Acting only as a courier service in delivering documents, picking up keys, or similar 
services, so long as the courier does not engage in any discussion of, or filling in of, the 
documents; 
(d) Placing brokerage signs on listed properties; 
(e) Having keys made for listed properties; and 
(f) Securing public records from the County Recorders' Offices, zoning offices, sewer 
districts, water districts, or similar entities. 
6.2.15.1. If personal assistants are compensated for their work, they shall be compensated at 
a predetermined rate which is not contingent upon the occurrence of real estate transactions. 
Licensees may not share commissions with unlicensed persons who have assisted in transactions 
by performing the services listed in this rule. 
6.2.15.2. The licensee who hires the unlicensed person will be responsible for supervising 
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the unlicensed person's activities, and shall ensure that the unlicensed person does not perform 
activity which requires a real estate license. 
6.2.15.3. Unlicensed individuals may not engage in telephone solicitation or other activity 
calculated to result in securing prospects for real estate transactions, except as provided in 
R162-6.2.15.(a) above. 
6.2.16. Fiduciary Duties. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf owe the 
following fiduciary duties to the principal: 
6.2.16.1. Duties of a seller's or lessor's agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his 
behalf who act solely on behalf of the seller or the lessor owe the seller or the lessor the 
following fiduciary duties: 
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to act in the best interest of the seller or the lessor 
instead of all other interests, including the agent's own; 
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the seller or 
lessor; 
(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller or lessor all material 
information which the agent learns about the buyer or lessee or about the transaction; 
(d) Confidentiality, which prohibits the agent from disclosing any information given to the 
agent by the seller or lessor which would likely weaken the seller's or lessor's bargaining position 
if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the seller or lessor to disclose the 
information. This duty does not require the agent to withhold any known material fact 
concerning a defect in the property or the seller's or lessor's ability to perform his obligations; 
(e) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(f) Holding safe and accounting for all money or property entrusted to the agent; and 
(g) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.2. Duties of a buyer's or lessee's agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his 
behalf who act solely on behalf of the buyer or lessee owe the buyer or lessee the following 
fiduciary duties: 
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to act in the best interest of the buyer or lessee instead 
of all other interests, including the agent's own; 
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the buyer or 
lessee; 
(c) Full Disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the buyer or lessee all material 
information which the agent learns about the property or the seller's or lessor's ability to perform 
his obligations; 
(d) Confidentiality, which prohibits the agent from disclosing any information given to the 
agent by the buyer or lessee which would likely weaken the buyer's or lessee's bargaining 
position if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the buyer or lessee to disclose 
the information. This duty does not permit the agent to misrepresent, either affirmatively or by 
omission, the buyer's or lessee's financial condition or ability to perform; 
(e) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(f) Holding safe and accounting for all money or property entrusted to the agent; and 
(g) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.3. Duties of a limited agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf 
who act as agent for both seller and buyer, or lessor and lessee, commonly referred to as "dual 
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agents," are limited agents since the fiduciary duties owed to seller and to buyer, or to lessor and 
lessee, are inherently contradictory. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf may 
act in this limited agency capacity only if the informed consent of both buyer and seller, or lessor 
and lessee, is obtained. 
6.2.16.3.1. In order to obtain informed consent, the principal broker or a licensee acting on 
his behalf shall clearly explain to both buyer and seller, or lessor and lessee, that they are each 
entitled to be represented by their own agent if they so choose, and shall obtain written 
agreement from both parties that they will each be giving up performance by the agent of the 
following fiduciary duties: 
(a) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to buyer and seller, or 
lessor and lessee, that they are giving up their right to demand undivided loyalty from the agent, 
although the agent, acting in this neutral capacity, shall advance the interest of each party so long 
as it does not conflict with the interest of the other party. In the event of conflicting interests, the 
agent will be held to the standard of neutrality; and 
(b) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to buyer and seller, or 
lessor and lessee, that there will be a conflict as to a limited agent's duties of confidentiality and 
full disclosure, and shall explain what kinds of information will be held confidential if told to a 
limited agent by either buyer or seller, or lessor and lessee, and what kinds of information will be 
disclosed if told to the limited agent by either party. The limited agent may not disclose any 
information given to the agent by either principal which would likely weaken that party's 
bargaining position if it were known, unless the agent has permission from the principal to 
disclose the information; and 
(c) The principal broker or a licensee acting on his behalf shall explain to the buyer and 
seller, or lessor and lessee, that the limited agent will be required to disclose information given to 
the agent in confidence by one of the parties if failure to disclose the information would be a 
material misrepresentation regarding the property or regarding the abilities of the parties to fulfill 
their obligations. 
(d) The Division and the Commission shall consider use of consent language approved by 
the Division and the Commission to be informed consent. 
6.2.16.3.2. In addition, a limited agent owes the following fiduciary duties to all parties: 
(a) Obedience, which obligates the limited agent to obey all lawfiil instructions from either 
the buyer or the seller, lessor and lessee, consistent with the agent's duty of neutrality; 
(b) Reasonable care and diligence; 
(c) Holding safe all money or property entrusted to the limited agent; and 
(d) Any additional duties created by the agency agreement. 
6.2.16.4. Duties of a sub-agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who 
act as sub-agents owe the same fiduciary duty to a principal as the brokerage retained by the 
principal. 
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ADDENDUM 
D 
1 
61-2-1. License required. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or 
assume to act as a principal real estate broker, associate real estate broker, or a real estate sales 
agent within this state without a license obtained under this chapter. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person outside the state to engage in the business, act in the 
capacity of, advertise, or assume to act as a principal real estate broker, associate real estate 
broker, or a real estate sales agent with respect to real estate located within the state without a 
license obtained under this chapter. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 110, § 1; R.S. 1933, 82-2-1; L. 1939, ch. 106, § 1; C. 1943, 82-2-1; L. 
1983, ch. 257, § 1; 1985, ch. 162, § 1; 1996, ch. 102, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, made a stylistic change and 
added Subsection (2). 
Cross-References. - Statute of frauds, brokers' contracts as within, § 25-5-4. 
Timeshare and camp resort project salesperson, § 57-19-14. 
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E 
1 
61-2-6. Licensing procedures and requirements. 
(1) The Real Estate Commission shall determine the qualifications and requirements of 
applicants for a principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent license. The division, with the 
concurrence of the commission, shall require and pass upon proof necessary to determine the 
honesty, integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and competency of each applicant for an initial 
license or for renewal of an existing license. The division, with the concurrence of the 
commission, shall require an applicant for a sales agent license to complete an approved 
educational program not to exceed 90 hours, and an applicant for an associate broker or principal 
broker license to complete an approved educational program not to exceed 120 hours. The hours 
required by this section mean 50 minutes of instruction in each 60 minutes; and the maximum 
number of program hours available to an individual is ten hours per day. The division, with the 
concurrence of the commission, shall require the applicant to pass an examination approved by 
the commission covering the fundamentals of the English language, arithmetic, bookkeeping, 
real estate principles and practices, the provisions of this chapter, the rules established by the 
Real Estate Commission, and any other aspect of Utah real estate license law considered 
appropriate. Three years1 full-time experience as a real estate sales agent or its equivalent is 
required before any applicant may apply for, and secure a principal broker or associate broker 
license in this state. The commission shall establish by rule the criteria by which it will accept 
experience or special education in similar fields of business in lieu of the three years' experience. 
(2) (a) The division, with the concurrence of the commission, may require an applicant to 
furnish a sworn statement setting forth evidence satisfactory to the division of the applicant's 
reputation and competency as set forth by rule. 
(b) The division shall require an applicant to provide his social security number, which is a 
private record under Subsection 63-2-302(l)(g). 
(3) A nonresident principal broker may be licensed in this state by conforming to all the 
provisions of this chapter except that of residency. A nonresident associate broker or sales agent 
may become licensed in this state by conforming to all the provisions of this chapter except that 
of residency and by being employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf of a 
nonresident or resident principal broker who is licensed in this state. 
(4) An applicant who has had a real estate license revoked shall be relicensed as prescribed 
for an original application, but may not apply for a new license until at least five years after the 
revocation. In the case of an applicant for a new license as a principal broker or associate broker, 
the applicant is not entitled to credit for experience gained prior to the revocation of license. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 110, § 6; 1925, ch. 79, § 1; 1929, ch. 77, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
82-2-6; 1951, ch. 102, § 1; 1951, ch. 103, § 1; 1963, ch. 146, § 1; 1975, ch. 172, § 13; 1979, ch. 
194, § 2; 1983, ch. 257, § 7; 1985, ch. 162, § 7; 1988, ch. 182, § 2; 1993, ch. 146, § 2; 1997, ch. 
232, § 26. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997 added Subsection (2)(b) and 
made a related redesignation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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ADDENDUM 
F 
1 
78-12-23. Within six years - Mesne profits of real property - Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except 
those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-12-23; L. 1984, ch. 16, § 2; 1996, ch. 79, § 
109; 1996, ch. 210, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective April 29, 1996, in the introductory 
paragraph, substituted "An action may be brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An action" at the beginning 
of Subsections (1) to (3); and in Subsections (1) and (2), substituted a semicolon for a period. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 210, effective April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3) regarding 
distribution of criminal proceeds to victims. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
Cross-References. - Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78-15-3. 
Promise to pay extends period, § 78-12-44. 
Three-year limitation period for action on written insurance contract, § 31A-21-313. 
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ADDENDUM 
G 
1 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed 
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon 
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified 
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or ftoher affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
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ADDENDUM 
H 
§ 897 TORTS SECOND Ch. 46 
§ 897. Merger in Judgment 
A cause of action for a tort may be terminated by its 
merger in a valid judgment for the plaintiff. 
Comment: 
a. It is not within the scope of this Restatement to treat the 
details of the principle of res judicata, including the application 
of the rule of merger. For statement of this rule, see Restate-
ment, Second, Judgments § 47 (Tent. Draft). 
§ 898* Bar by Judgment 
A cause of action for a tort may be terminated because 
it is barred by a previous valid judgment for the defend-
ant. 
Comment: 
a. It is not within the scope of this Restatement to treat the 
details of the principle of res judicata, including the application 
of the rule of bar. For statement of the rule, see Restatement, 
Second, Judgments § 48 (Tent. Draft). 
§ 899. Statutes of Limitations 
A cause of action for a tort may be barred through 
lapse of time because of the provisions of a statute of 
limitations. 
Comment: 
a. The statutes commonly known as statutes of limitations 
are ordinarily applicable to actions at law and to equitable pro-
ceedings in which there is a concurrent legal remedy. As fre-
quently interpreted, they do not apply to equitable proceedings 
based upon purely equitable rights. In many states, however, 
statutes are specifically applicable to equitable proceedings and 
in other states equitable proceedings may be barred by analogy 
to the statutes of limitations. For specific statements with ref-
erence to statutes limiting the time in which actions for the re-
covery of land and for harm to land may be brought, see Restate-
ment of Property, §§ 220-227. 
b. An act and its consequences may be both a tort and a 
breach of contract and may also give rise to a restitutionary 
right When this is so, the injured person, although barred by 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross Beferences 
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a statute from maintaining an action of tort may not be barred 
from enforcing his contractual or restitutionary right or vice 
versa, since the statutes commonly provide for a different period 
of limitation for tort actions and for those based upon a breach 
of contract or the right of restitution. A statute of limitations 
frequently provides for a longer period for one type of wrong, 
such as a conversion, than for another type, such as an injury 
to reputation. 
A person injured by a tort that would be indivisible if he were 
to bring action at once may be able to maintain an action for the 
damage not barred by the statute, although his remedy for the 
other harm has been barred. Thus when a car and its owners 
are injured in a collision, the cause of action for harm to the per-
son may terminate before that for harm to the chattel. When 
there are joint tortfeasors, the cause of action may be barred 
against one tortfeasor and not against another, either because 
there is a statute applicable to only one of the tortfeasors or 
because one of them leaves the jurisdiction. On nuisance, see 
Comment d. 
c. Time when statute begins to run. Statutes of limitations 
ordinarily provide that an action may be commenced only within 
a specified period after the cause of action arises. Although the 
courts have not been consistent in applying this limitation strict-
ly, the interpretation of the statute as applied to torts has been 
such that the statute does not usually begin to run until the tort 
is complete, and may not begin to run even then if there has been 
a series of continuous acts. 
A tort is ordinarily not complete until there has been an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest of the plaintiff. Thus when 
one makes a fraudulent misrepresentation to another, the tort is 
not complete until the other acts upon it to his detriment. 
A battery is complete upon physical contact, even though there 
is no observable damage at the point of contact. An assault is 
complete when anticipation of harm occurs. A cause of action 
for negligently harming a person or a thing is complete when the 
harm occurs. A cause of action for mental shock or mental dis-
tress is complete when the shock or distress occurs, if the shock 
or distress itself is sufficient for the tort (see § 46); but if some 
resulting bodily harm is necessary to the cause of action, it is 
not complete until the bodily harm occurs. For false imprison-
ment, the statute begins to run only when the imprisonment 
ends, since the period of imprisonment is treated as a unit. 
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